Whether on the complaining or defending end of a trade secret complaint, employers can agree on one thing: trade secret litigation is expensive. Over the past several years, what was already a costly process had become even more burdensome, as litigants expended tens of thousands of dollars bringing and defending against motions — even holding full-blown “mini trials” — to determine whether the trade secrets at issue had been identified with sufficient particularity to allow the plaintiff to begin trade secret discovery. Companies with trade secrets at risk faced a dilemma: on the one hand, trade secret law demands that companies use “reasonable efforts” (including litigation, if necessary) to protect their trade secrets; on the other hand, early trade secret procedural maneuvers threatened to break the bank. Likewise, companies defending against complaints had to carefully assess the very high potential costs of the “trade secret identification” battle against allowing a competitor early access to their confidential information.
Now, it appears that certain companies — particularly (but not exclusively) those outside of high-tech or other complex industries — may have a much less expensive path to taking discovery about alleged misappropriated trade secrets. A recent California Court of Appeals ruling, Brescia v. Angelin, should eliminate a lot of the gamesmanship and expense associated with designating trade secrets prior to commencing trade secret discovery.
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2019.210 provides that discovery relating to a trade secret claim may not commence until the plaintiff first identifies its trade secrets with “reasonable particularity.” In Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court,1 the Court held that where a qualified expert is capable of understanding the designation and of distinguishing the alleged trade secrets from information already known to persons in the field, the trade secrets designation should, as a general rule, be considered adequate. In recent years, companies engaged in litigation in California involving former employees or competing companies allegedly stealing trade secrets often had to undertake a painstakingly expensive and time-consuming procedural process of trade secret identification, before discovery commenced, in order to satisfy the Section 2019.210 “reasonable particularity” standard.
In Brescia v. Angelin, William Brescia claimed that he developed a pudding product called Pro Pudding Pak with the help of a food scientist he employed named Christopher Scinto (“Scinto”). Brescia contracted with two companies, Performance Worldwide USA, Inc. (“Performance”) and Instone, LLC (“Instone”), for the sale and distribution of the pudding. Subsequently Scinto and a Performance employee started a new company called Freedom Foods, Inc. (“Freedom”). Brescia claimed that Scinto, Instone and Freedom conspired with a former executive of Performance and Instone to produce and sell a pudding based on Brescia’s formula. A lawsuit soon followed.
At the trial court level, Brescia attempted to obtain documents from, and depose the Chairman of the Board and CEO of, Instone, claiming that his trade secrets were sufficiently identified in his cross-complaint and in already produced documents. In response, Instone’s executives sought protective orders, contending that Brescia had failed to identify his alleged trade secrets with the “reasonable particularity” required by CCP § 2019.210.
Brescia amended the identification of his trade secrets as “Marketing Strategies,” “Budget and Finance,” “Formula,” and “Manufacturing Process,” which referred to 305 pages of documents that had already been produced. Still, the trial court ruled that his descriptions of his trade secrets were inadequate because he obscured the trade secrets by citing to voluminous documents. Brescia then provided an amended identification of his trade secrets that included the 15 specific ingredients of the pudding formula and step-by-step details of the manufacturing process, including each step in the mixing, testing, and code marking of the pudding.
The Instone executives again contended that Brescia’s trade secrets were not “reasonably particular,” because he failed to essentially prove that the identified information constituted “trade secrets,” by explaining how the information differed from matters within the general knowledge of persons skilled in the commercial food science field. In support of this argument, the Instone executives cited a patent application for a pudding formula that Scinto had filed, but which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office rejected on the basis that the formula would be obvious to those of ordinary skill in the culinary arts. The trial court agreed, and entered a judgment dismissing Brescia’s entire trade secret misappropriation claim.
On review, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that Brescia’s trade secret designation met the “reasonable particularity” requirement of Section 2019.210, “given the nature of the alleged trade secret and the technology in which it arises.” Brescia was not, for purposes of a pre-discovery Section 2019.210 identification, required to show how the alleged trade secrets differed from the knowledge of skilled persons in the industry.
The appellate court found that while Brescia’s prior identifications failed to meet the requirements of Section 2019.210, his final attempt was sufficient since it listed the 15 ingredients as well as the details of the manufacturing process. As a result, it was adequate enough to permit Instone to investigate the trade secret claim and prepare its defense, which it seemingly did by locating and producing the rejected patent application.
In effect, the Court of Appeals clarified the prior standard laid out in Advanced Modular Sputtering, involving companies in the far more complex “sputtering” industry — the process of depositing a thin and even film of material onto a silicon wafer — making it clear that such a standard was not a requirement for all trade secret cases. The Brescia Court made several important clarifications and affirmations about the role of Section 2019.210 in trade secret lawsuits, which collectively show that it is not to serve as a procedural device to litigate conclusively whether the information at issue actually constitutes a trade secret:
Lessons LearnedThe Brescia case will, in many industries, likely reduce some of
If already involved in litigation, companies should be mindful of
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Endnotes
1 132 Cal. App. 4th 826 (2005).
For assistance in this area, please contact one of the attorneys listed below or any member of your Mintz Levin client service team.
Micha “Mitch” Danzig
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MDanzig@mintz.com
Craig E. Hunsaker
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CHunsaker@mintz.com
Karineh Khachatourian
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Bryan J. Sinclair
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