DOJ Issues First-Ever Department-Wide Corporate Enforcement Policy: What Companies Need to Know

On March 10, 2026, the Department of Justice announced its first-ever Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (the “CEP”) — a significant step toward uniformity, predictability, and transparency in federal white-collar enforcement. The new policy supersedes the existing patchwork of component-specific and district-specific voluntary self-disclosure policies, replacing them with a single framework that applies across all DOJ criminal components (with the exception of antitrust matters). For companies operating in regulated industries and their counsel, the message is clear: the rules of the road are now uniform, and the stakes for getting them wrong have never been higher.

One Policy to Rule Them All: Replacing the Patchwork

Until now, companies facing potential criminal exposure had to navigate a fragmented landscape of voluntary self-disclosure policies that varied by DOJ component and U.S. Attorney’s Office. That patchwork, which included separate policies from the Criminal Division, the National Security Division, and individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices, left inconsistency and uncertainty for companies and their counsel. As recently as late February 2026, the Southern District of New York had announced its own office-specific policy, with U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton promising a “big carrot” for companies that self-reported and cooperated and a “big stick” for those that did not.

The new Department-wide CEP renders all of those component and district policies superseded and obsolete. What SDNY said weeks ago, and what the Criminal Division had in place since 2016 and revised most recently in May 2025, is now replaced by a single, unified framework. Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche described the policy as a product of “decades of experience across the Department” that “creates incentives for companies to come forward and do the right thing when misconduct occurs.” The goal, as stated in the policy itself, is to drive early voluntary self-disclosure, promote timely enforcement, reduce harm, and ensure consistency across the Department.

The Big Carrot: What Companies Earn by Coming Forward

The CEP’s structure is straightforward but demanding. A company that (1) voluntarily self-discloses misconduct to the appropriate DOJ criminal component, (2) fully cooperates with the ensuing investigation, and (3) timely and appropriately remediates the misconduct will — absent aggravating circumstances — receive a declination: i.e., no prosecution. This is the gold standard outcome, and the new policy makes it available on a Department-wide basis, not just through the Criminal Division at Main Justice.

Even where aggravating circumstances exist, prosecutors retain discretion to recommend a declination based on the weight of cooperation and remediation. And for “near miss” cases where a company cooperated and remediated but whose self-report fell just short of the technical definition of a voluntary self-disclosure, the policy provides for a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) of fewer than three years, no independent compliance monitor, and a fine reduction of 50 to 75 percent off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range.

Companies that fall entirely outside the declination and near-miss tracks are not without recourse, but they face prosecutors with broad discretion and a fine reduction capped at 50 percent. The message from the Department is intentional: cooperation pays, and the benefits are meaningful,  but only for those who move quickly and completely.

The Big Stick: Severe Consequences for Those Who Wait

The carrot is large, but so is the stick. DAG Blanche’s statement accompanying the policy’s release was unambiguous: “For those that do not [self-disclose], make no mistake — we will not hesitate to seek appropriate resolutions against companies and individuals alike that perpetrate white collar offenses that harm American interests.”

Companies that wait for DOJ to discover misconduct, whether through its own investigative tools, data analytics, or whistleblower tips, lose access to the policy’s substantial benefits entirely. In that scenario, prosecutors retain full discretion over the form of resolution, term length, monitor requirements, and monetary penalties. The floor, not the ceiling, becomes the starting point for negotiations.

Speed Is Not Optional: The Whistleblower Threat Is Real and Growing

We have written previously about the urgency that companies face when internal whistleblowers surface. In our February 2026 piece, The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: Why Companies Must Act Swiftly on Internal Complaints in the Current DOJ Enforcement Era, we detailed the competing financial incentives now in play: companies earn substantial benefits from self-disclosure, while individual whistleblowers can earn up to 30 percent of the first $100 million in net forfeiture proceeds by reporting directly to DOJ. The new Department-wide CEP sharpens this tension considerably.

The CEP expressly addresses the whistleblower dynamic. Under the policy’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program exception, a company can still earn a declination — even if a whistleblower reports to DOJ first — provided the company self-discloses within 120 days of receiving the whistleblower’s internal report and otherwise meets the requirements for voluntary self-disclosure. That 120-day window sounds generous. It is not. Companies should assume that a whistleblower who reports internally has already, or will shortly, report to DOJ as well. The internal clock and the DOJ clock are running simultaneously.

DOJ’s own data underscores the point. Since the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program launched in 2024, DOJ has received more than 1,100 submissions, with approximately 50 percent referred to prosecutors for investigation. Following the program’s expansion in May 2025, the referral rate climbed to 80 percent. In tandem with expanding data analytics capabilities that make independent government detection of misconduct increasingly likely, the window for companies to get ahead of DOJ — and reap the benefits of voluntary self-disclosure — is narrowing.

How the New Policy Compares to the May 2025 Criminal Division CEP

The May 2025 Criminal Division CEP — which we analyzed in depth in our piece Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Whistleblower Awards Initiatives Are Alive and Well in 2025 — established the baseline that the new Department-wide policy largely adopts and extends. The core architecture is the same: voluntary self-disclosure plus full cooperation plus timely remediation equals a presumptive declination. The near-miss track, the NPA-without-monitor default, and the fine reduction framework all carry over.

The key differences and developments are worth noting:

• Universal application. The most significant change is structural. The May 2025 policy applied only to Criminal Division matters. The new CEP applies to all DOJ criminal components, including U.S. Attorney’s Offices nationwide, except antitrust. A company with potential exposure in any federal district, and before any criminal component, is now subject to a single, consistent set of rules.
• Supersession of all prior policies. The new CEP explicitly supersedes all component-specific and U.S. Attorney’s Office-specific policies currently in effect — including the SDNY policy announced just weeks ago. Companies and counsel no longer need to navigate which office has what policy.
• Declination standard preserved. The May 2025 Criminal Division CEP moved from a “presumption” of declination to a commitment that DOJ “will” decline prosecution when the criteria are met (absent aggravating circumstances). The new Department-wide CEP maintains that higher standard, giving companies greater certainty about the benefits of coming forward.
• Fine reduction adjustment. The May 2025 Criminal Division CEP offered a 75 percent reduction from the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range for near-miss cases. The new Department-wide CEP specifies a range of 50 to 75 percent for near-miss cases — slightly narrowing the top-end benefit, though still substantial.
• Approval requirements. The new policy requires that all resolutions under the CEP be approved by the Assistant Attorney General for the relevant Division and/or the U.S. Attorney for the relevant district, in coordination with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. This adds a layer of senior oversight designed to ensure consistency in application across the Department.

The Bottom Line: Move Quickly or Lose the Carrot

The new Department-wide CEP represents the maturation of a voluntary self-disclosure framework that DOJ has been refining for nearly a decade. For companies, it offers genuine, meaningful benefits, but only to those who act decisively and promptly. The key takeaways are these:

• DOJ’s detection capabilities are improving. Data analytics and AI-assisted review are making it increasingly likely that DOJ will independently discover misconduct. The window for getting ahead of the government is real, but it is not unlimited.
• Whistleblowers are financially motivated to report. The Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program gives employees strong financial incentives to report both internally and to DOJ. Companies cannot assume that internal reports stay internal.
• The rules are now uniform. The patchwork of component and district policies is gone. Companies and counsel can now work from a single, authoritative framework — which reduces uncertainty but also eliminates the ability to forum-shop or rely on idiosyncratic local policies.
• Speed is the most critical variable. A company that deliberates too long loses the ability to self-disclose before DOJ learns of the misconduct through other means. Once that happens, the benefits of the CEP are no longer available.

For companies navigating potential criminal exposure, robust internal reporting mechanisms, rapid and thorough investigation protocols, and experienced counsel who can assess the disclosure calculus in real time are not optional — they are essential. The Department has made the path to a favorable resolution clear. Walking that path requires moving quickly.

 

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