Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Whistleblower Awards Initiatives Are Alive and Well in 2025: DOJ Issues White-Collar Enforcement Priorities for the New Administration

The first 120 days of the Trump administration have been characterized by dramatic changes in the realm of white-collar enforcement. However, in the midst of a period wrought with uncertainty over what the administration may do next, savvy companies can leverage emerging priorities in a strategic manner.

Early Indications of the Administration’s Shifting Priorities

While each change of administration, particularly those along party lines, inevitably results in policy alterations, the initial changes instituted by the Trump administration have ventured beyond the norm.

Perhaps the most significant early update in the realm of white-collar enforcement was the manner in which more traditional areas of corporate concern were seemingly deprioritized. Executive orders, memoranda from key leadership posts, and other directives curtailed select corporate enforcement efforts at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other federal agencies.

For example, a February 10, 2025 Executive Order (EO) paused enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for the first time since the statute was passed in 1977. The EO explained that the administration’s priority is to “eliminat[e] excessive barriers to American commerce abroad.” During a 180-day period (which may be extended), Attorney General (AG) Pam Bondi is directed to “review guidelines and policies governing investigations and enforcement actions under the FCPA.” More specifically, in this time the AG will 1) cease initiation of new FCPA investigations and enforcement actions (unless she determines that an individual exception is warranted); 2) review all existing FCPA investigations and enforcement actions in order to “restore proper bounds on FCPA enforcement and preserve Presidential foreign policy prerogatives”; and 3) issue updated guidelines or policies.

Just five days before publication of this EO, a memorandum issued by the AG’s office signaled a shift away from more traditional FCPA cases. It explained that the Criminal Division’s FCPA Unit will prioritize investigations related to foreign bribery that facilitates the criminal operation of cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) (e.g., bribing foreign officials “to facilitate human smuggling and the trafficking of narcotics and firearms”).

Other early reports expressed that the administration has/had halted all pending environmental litigation, dealing a significant blow to DOJ’s Environment and Natural Resources Division (ENRD). The lasting implications of this choice remain to be seen, but it is readily apparent that the ENRD will face significant resource constraints under the current administration, likely curtailing its enforcement efforts.

In addition, approximately one month after President Trump issued a meme coin, the SEC published a February 27, 2025 staff statement explaining its view that, as a general matter, transactions involving meme coins “do not involve the offer and sale of securities under the federal securities laws.” As a result, “neither meme coin purchasers nor holders are protected by the federal securities laws.”[1] While a deeper, case-by-case analysis of this issue may prove necessary in application, the staff statement’s very existence signals a departure from the crypto-related enforcement priorities of the Biden administration.

An April 7, 2025 memorandum issued by Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche further states that DOJ will end the “reckless strategy of regulation by prosecution” with respect to digital assets. In this space, harm to retail investors from plainly fraudulent behavior will be prioritized over more novel theories of liability that implicate the securities laws. DOJ’s digital asset investigations and prosecutions “shall focus on prosecuting individuals who victimize digital asset investors, or those who use digital assets in furtherance of criminal offenses such as terrorism, narcotics and human trafficking, organized crime, hacking, and cartel and gang financing.”

While certainly not a comprehensive list, these examples are illustrative of the administration’s shifting enforcement priorities.

The Galeotti Memorandum: Defining the New Enforcement Landscape

On May 12, 2025, Head of the Criminal Division Matthew R. Galeotti issued a memorandum titled “Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime” (the “Galeotti Memo”), which sets forth DOJ’s white-collar enforcement priorities with more clarity.

The Galeotti Memo encourages DOJ to strike an appropriate balance between addressing “significant threats” to US interests (e.g., rampant fraud in US markets and government programs) and preventing “overbroad and unchecked” corporate enforcement that burdens US businesses. To achieve this objective, prosecutors will be guided by three core tenets: 1) focus, 2) fairness, and 3) efficiency.

1) Focus

The Criminal Division is focused on combatting what it perceives as the most urgent criminal threats to the US. Accordingly, it will prioritize investigating and prosecuting white-collar crimes in the following “high-impact” areas:

• Waste, fraud, and abuse, including health care fraud and federal program and procurement fraud.
• Trade and customs fraud, including tariff evasion.
• Fraud perpetrated through variable interest entities, including offering fraud, “ramp and dumps,” elder fraud, securities fraud, and other market manipulation schemes.
• Fraud that victimizes US investors, individuals, and markets, including Ponzi schemes, investment fraud, and fraud that threatens the health and safety of consumers.
• Conduct that threatens US national security, including threats to the US financial system by gatekeepers, such as financial institutions and their insiders that commit sanctions violations or enable transactions by cartels, TCOs, hostile nation-states, or foreign terrorist organizations.
• Material support by corporations to foreign terrorist organizations, including recently designated cartels and TCOs.
• Complex money laundering, including organizations involved in laundering funds used in the manufacturing of illegal drugs.
• Violations of the Controlled Substances Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), including the unlawful manufacture and distribution of opioids by medical professionals and companies.
• Bribery and associated money laundering that impact US national interests, undermine US national security, harm the competitiveness of US businesses, and enrich foreign corrupt officials.[2]
• Crimes 1) involving digital assets that victimize investors and consumers, 2) that use digital assets in furtherance of other criminal conduct, and 3) that include willful violations that facilitate significant criminal activity. With respect to this category, DOJ’s highest priority will be cases impacting victims; involving cartels, TCOs, or terrorist groups; or facilitating drug money laundering or sanctions evasion.

Prosecutors are directed to “prioritize schemes involving senior-level personnel or other culpable actors” as well as cases with demonstrable loss and efforts to obstruct justice.

2) Fairness

The Galeotti Memo acknowledges that “[n]ot all corporate misconduct warrants federal criminal prosecution,” especially where a company demonstrates that it is “willing to learn from [its] mistakes.” Prosecuting individual criminals, while reserving civil and administrative means to target the corporation, may be appropriate if only “low-level corporate misconduct” is at issue. Accordingly, when assessing whether to charge a corporation, prosecutors are directed to consider whether the company self-reported, cooperated with the government, and remediated its misconduct.

If a corporate criminal resolution is necessary, the Galeotti Memo instructs prosecutors to consider all forms — non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), and guilty pleas — based on the individual facts at issue.

Corporate resolutions with companies that cooperate and remediate should have terms of no longer than three years, except in exceedingly rare cases, and prosecutors are encouraged to regularly reassess such agreements to determine whether they should be terminated early.

3) Efficiency

The Galeotti Memo recognizes that many corporate investigations are costly, interfere substantially with day-to-day business operations, and cause reputational harm. While complex, cross-border schemes necessarily take “substantial time and effort to unravel,” the Galeotti Memo acknowledges that, from the company’s perspective, certain white-collar investigations appear to linger for years “with little meaningful progress.” To combat this perceived delay, the Galeotti Memo directs prosecutors to “move expeditiously to investigate cases and make charging decisions.” Federal investigations will be tracked to “ensure that they do not linger and are swiftly concluded.”

The Galeotti Memo also states that independent compliance monitors should be utilized only when necessary and monitorships, when imposed, should be narrowly tailored to achieve the required goals while minimizing expense, burden, and business interference. To that end, DOJ is reviewing all existing monitorships to determine whether each remains necessary.[3]

The Current State of Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Whistleblower Awards

Certain key policy initiatives championed under President Biden’s DOJ, such as those incentivizing voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) of misconduct, appear alive and well under the new administration. In fact, such initiatives are expanding to further DOJ’s current goals and provide greater incentives for companies willing to come forward.

The Galeotti Memo reaffirms DOJ’s commitment to VSD, explaining that the initiative has “resulted in the Department bringing more cases against individual wrongdoers while rewarding good corporate citizens.” Accordingly, on May 12, 2025, the Criminal Division issued a revised Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (the “Revised CEP”).[4]

According to the Galeotti Memo, the Revised CEP “clarif[ies] that additional benefits are available to companies that self-disclose and cooperate, including potential shorter terms.” As an overarching goal, DOJ aimed to make the Revised CEP’s core components — the pathways to a declination, the available fine reductions for a company’s cooperation and remediation, and factors that determine the contours of a corporate resolution — more easily understandable.

The Revised CEP itself begins by reiterating the Criminal Division’s commitment to transparency and explains that, absent particular aggravating circumstances, DOJ will decline to prosecute a company for criminal conduct when the company voluntarily self-discloses the misconduct to the Criminal Division, fully cooperates with the ensuing investigation, and timely and appropriately remediates the misconduct. This is more generous than the previous iteration of the CEP, which offered only the presumption of a declination for meeting the requisite criteria. Even when aggravating circumstances are present, prosecutors retain discretion to recommend a declination based on a company’s cooperation and remediation.[5]

Importantly, the Revised CEP also provides tangible benefits in 1) so-called “Near Miss” cases where a company fully cooperates and timely and appropriately remediates but nevertheless is rendered ineligible for a declination solely because its good faith self-report does not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure,[6] and 2) instances where aggravating factors are present that necessitate a criminal resolution. In such situations, the Criminal Division will:

• Provide an NPA (absent particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances); 
• Allow an NPA term length of less than three years; 
• Not require an independent compliance monitor; and 
• Provide a reduction of 75% off the low end of the US Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) fine range.

The Revised CEP also explains that, in other cases that do not meet the declination or “Near Miss” criteria set forth above, prosecutors retain discretion to determine appropriate resolutions, including with respect to form, term length, compliance obligations, and monetary penalty. However, the Revised CEP states that a company will not receive, and the Criminal Division will not recommend to a sentencing court, a reduction of more than 50% off the fine under the USSG. In addition, there will be a presumption that the reduction will be taken from the low end of the USSG range in cases where companies fully cooperate and timely and appropriately remediate. Otherwise, the starting point in the range will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

The Revised CEP further includes appendices that contain a self-reporting flowchart and key definitions aimed at making both the requirements and associated benefits as digestible as possible for companies. Overall, the Revised CEP’s amendments signal an even friendlier approach to companies that are willing to come forward with a self-report.

This continued commitment to VSD is not surprising, as self-disclosure is ideologically consistent with the current administration’s goals. The existence of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), among numerous other recent efforts to reduce the footprint of the administrative state, are directly aligned with an initiative focused on encouraging companies to self-report their misconduct. Such policies reduce the time, effort, and resources that must be dedicated to government investigations.

For forward-thinking companies, particularly those that operate in areas the administration has deprioritized, VSD may constitute a strategic opportunity. For example, presume that Company A uncovers evidence of a serious violation today that has a statute of limitations that will extend into a future administration. Holding on to that information for years while seeking to quietly remediate the issue may prove an unnecessary risk. Alternatively, disclosing that information to members of a potentially under-resourced agency, particularly where the substance of the violation falls outside of that agency’s enforcement priorities, could maximize the likelihood of a swift and favorable resolution.

In addition to issuing the Revised CEP, on May 12, 2025, DOJ also updated its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (the “Revised Whistleblower Awards Program”),[7] which offers the prospect of a financial award to whistleblowers who provide DOJ with original, truthful information regarding certain crimes. More specifically, the Revised Whistleblower Awards Program adds the following new enforcement priorities as eligible subject areas that may qualify for an award when reported on:

• Violations by or through companies related to fraud against the US in connection with federally funded contracting or federal programs, where such fraud does not involve health care or illegal health care kickbacks; 
• Violations by or through companies related to trade, tariff, and customs fraud; 
• Violations by or through companies implicating federal immigration law; 
• Violations by or through companies related to sanctions offenses; 
• Violations by or through companies related to material support of terrorism; and 
• Violations by or through companies related to cartels/TCOs, including money laundering, narcotics, Controlled Substances Act, and other violations.

These additional subject areas constitute a significant expansion of the program from its previous iteration. The Revised Whistleblower Awards Program also has potentially serious ramifications in the health care context. With respect to health care cases, the last iteration of the program was focused on encouraging whistleblower tips related to health care fraud schemes that could not be pursued via qui tam actions (e.g., cases where the “overwhelming majority” of claims were submitted to private or other nonpublic health care benefit programs).

While the Galeotti Memo is limited to discussing the new eligibility areas that were added to the Revised Whistleblower Awards Program, the program’s language also appears to have been revised to remove significant limitations that existed in the previous version. Notably, the following language has been eliminated from the Revised Whistleblower Awards Program:

• The requirement that violations related to federal health care offenses involve “private or other non-public” health care benefit programs and that the “overwhelming majority of claims are submitted to private or other non-public health care benefit programs”; 
• The requirement that patients, investors, and other nongovernmental entities in the health care industry bear “the overwhelming majority of the actual or intended loss”; and 
• The entire reporting category dedicated to “other federal violations involving conduct related to health care not covered by the Federal False Claims Act” (FCA).

As a result, if whistleblowers can now report directly to DOJ information regarding federal health care offenses and related crimes involving health care benefit programs, they may opt to utilize the Revised Whistleblower Awards Program in lieu of (or in addition to) a traditional qui tam / FCA case. As the impact of such changes could be significant, the Galeotti Memo’s failure to mention them is puzzling. In addition, the FAQ page associated with the program continues to state (as it has since publication of the prior iteration) that the program’s aim is addressing “health care fraud that is not covered by the qui tam program.” Additional or revised guidance that explains exactly how the Revised Whistleblower Awards Program is intended to interact with the qui tam program in light of these textual revisions is thus likely in the near future.

In sum, as long as policies encouraging culpable individuals and whistleblowers[8] to report corporate misconduct remain in effect, companies will face an ever-present threat of disclosure from individual actors with knowledge of the activity. Failing to disclose misconduct now could result in greater future penalties.

Recent Self-Disclosure Case Study

On April 30, 2025, DOJ declined to prosecute a company that self-reported to DOJ’s National Security Division (NSD) criminal violations of US export control laws committed by a former employee. According to the corresponding press release, the employee violated Export Administration Regulations by “exporting US Army–developed aviation software to a university in the People’s Republic of China . . . that had been placed on the Commerce Department’s Entity List.”

DOJ cited the VSD provisions of the NSD Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations (the “NSD Enforcement Policy”) as supporting its decision not to prosecute. Specifically, similar to other VSD policies, the NSD Enforcement Policy includes a presumption that companies that voluntarily self-disclose to NSD potential criminal violations arising out of or relating to the enforcement of export control or sanctions laws; fully cooperate with any ensuing investigation; and timely and appropriately remediate the misconduct will receive an NPA. In appropriate cases, prosecutors may exercise their discretion to issue a declination.[9]

The press release in this instance focused heavily on the company’s swift VSD and significant cooperation. It states that within days of learning the employee had violated export control laws, “and before [the company] had completed its own investigation to understand the scope of the misconduct, [it] self-disclosed the crime to NSD and fully cooperated with the ensuing criminal investigation, which eventually established that [the employee] had acted alone.”

The company’s cooperation included “proactively identifying, collecting, and disclosing relevant evidence to investigators, including foreign language evidence and evidence located overseas, and providing detailed and timely responses to the government’s requests for information and evidence.” Remediation included disciplining a supervisor and significantly bolstering the company’s internal controls and compliance program. The press release notes that this constitutes just the second time that NSD has exercised its discretion to decline the prosecution of a company under the NSD Enforcement Policy, clearly signaling the strategic advantages of VSD moving forward.

What to Expect Next

Use of the FCA as a vehicle to carry out many of the administration’s current priorities, such as tariff noncompliance and alleged illegal Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) practices, is expected.[10] AG Bondi has affirmed her commitment to defending the constitutionality of the FCA, and DOJ leaders have confirmed plans to utilize the FCA “aggressively.”

For example, a January 21, 2025 EO dedicated to “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity” orders all executive agencies to “combat illegal private-sector DEI preferences, mandates, policies, programs, and activities.” The EO requires the head of each executive agency to include in every federal contract or grant award 1) a term requiring the contractual counterparty or grant recipient to agree that its compliance in all respects with federal anti-discrimination laws is material to the government’s payment decision for purposes of the FCA; and 2) a term requiring the counterparty or recipient to certify that it does not operate any DEI programs that violate federal anti-discrimination laws.[11] Such provisions are aimed at creating a clearer pathway to FCA liability for federal contractors who refuse to comply.[12]

Accordingly, applicable companies should anticipate an uptick in unique applications of the FCA and educate themselves regarding how the administration’s priorities may implicate their business. In addition, as priorities continue to shift and lingering practices from the Biden administration are scrutinized, remaining vigilant and monitoring updates from the administration will prove invaluable for legal and compliance functions.

Key Takeaways

• The policy changes ushered in by the Trump administration to date are more dramatic than those typically associated with an administration change.
• Companies are incentivized to conduct refreshed risk assessments and take inventory of their compliance systems in light of rapidly evolving enforcement priorities. Policy gaps that do not adequately capture today’s risks could quickly prove insufficient.
• DOJ’s Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Whistleblower Awards initiatives are being expanded to serve modern priorities. With a heightened focus on the strategic use of the False Claims Act, whistleblower risk remains important for companies to keep top-of-mind. Employee hotlines and other internal reporting mechanisms that help identify potential misconduct at its outset must be adequately resourced and effective in application.
• Now is a strategic time to consider self-reporting and other creative steps toward resolution that appeal to principles of efficiency. In the DOGE era, as fewer resources are potentially devoted to traditional corporate enforcement, the risk of self-reporting may be outweighed by the reward of a discounted, swift resolution that puts the matter to rest (and out of reach for future administrations). In addition, for companies that can meet the Revised CEP’s requirements, a declination may be more easily attainable than ever before.

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