Do Text Messages Still Trigger TCPA National and Internal DNC Claims Post-McKesson?
Over the last few years, the Supreme Court breathed new life into a variety of defendant-friendly TCPA arguments. A product of those decisions, including McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., has been an increasing number of courts concluding that text messages, or even wireless phone numbers, do not fall within the scope of the TCPA’s private right of action used by plaintiffs to bring National Do Not Call Registry and Internal Do Not Call List claims.
Leading the charge is the Seventh Circuit’s Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services decision, where the Court of Appeals concluded that text messages do not fall within the ambit of the private right of action at 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As the Seventh Circuit explained, the TCPA defines a “telephone solicitation” to mean “a telephone call or message.” Critically, however, the private right of action at Section 227(c)(5) only references “telephone calls.”
Because § 227’s definition of telephone solicitation distinguishes between calls and messages, the two must refer to different forms of communication by telephone. . . . Based on how telephone messages were understood at the time of enactment, we conclude that modern-day text messages are better understood as messages, not calls.
. . .
Thus, both the overall statutory scheme and the ordinary public meaning of telephone call indicate that § 227(c)(5)’s private right of action does not extend to unwanted text messages.[1]
Among arguments to the contrary raised by the plaintiffs was a plea for FCC deference. The Seventh Circuit’s response was twofold:
[T]he plaintiffs point to the FCC’s decision to extend National Do-Not-Call Registry protections to text messages. . . . But the National Do-Not-Call Registry was implemented pursuant to § 227(c)(3), which refers to “telephone solicitations,” so the FCC’s interpretation doesn’t inform our understanding of § 227(c)(5), which refers only to telephone calls.
Even if it did, we aren’t bound by the FCC’s interpretation. McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp. . . . .[2]
Against this backdrop, a variety of courts outside of the Seventh Circuit have continued to exclude text messages, or cellular phone numbers, from the reach of Section 227(c)(5) (and the National DNC and Internal DNC regulations):
- Conrad v. Hart Consumer Products, No. 24-cv-307, 2026 WL 2741623 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 16, 2026)
- Anthony v. Brian Marketing Group, No. 24-cv-80800, 2026 WL 2685650 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2026)
- Card v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., No. 26-cv-433, 2026 WL 2673068 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2026)
- Rush v. Selectquote Insurance Services, Inc., No. 26-cv-03157, 2026 WL 2495598 (W.D. Mo. July 30, 2026)
Steidinger and district court decisions reaching the same conclusion are a welcome reprieve in a space filled with professional plaintiffs. Companies engaged in texting should keep in mind that this is a developing area of law, be mindful of state laws, and consult an attorney to evaluate how these developments may impact their specific practices.
[1]Steidinger v. Blackstone Med. Servs., 182 F.4th 532, 536–37 (7th Cir. 2026).
[2]Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
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